The DORA regulation (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, the Digital Operational Resilience Act) sets uniform requirements for how EU financial entities manage ICT risk, report major ICT-related incidents, test their digital operational resilience and manage ICT third-party risk. It has applied since 17 January 2025 to 20 categories of financial entities, from banks and insurers to crypto-asset service providers, and it brings critical ICT third-party service providers under direct EU oversight.
For compliance teams, the question is no longer what DORA requires, but whether they can show it.
The Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) gives the EU financial sector one common set of rules for managing ICT risk. Until then, rules and supervisory practices on ICT risk differed from country to country, which the legislator saw as an obstacle to the internal market for financial services (recital 9). The DORA regulation addresses this with uniform requirements on ICT risk management, incident reporting, resilience testing, information sharing and ICT third-party risk, so that the whole sector reaches a high common level of digital operational resilience (Article 1).
In legal terms, DORA consists of two texts:
The regulation entered into force on 16 January 2023 and has applied since 17 January 2025. It is binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States (Article 64).
The scope is broad, but not unlimited.
Article 2(1) lists 20 categories of financial entities:
ICT third-party service providers are listed separately: they are in scope through the contracts they sign with financial entities and, when designated as critical, through direct oversight.
Some entities fall outside DORA, such as insurance intermediaries that are microenterprises or SMEs, and institutions for occupational retirement provision whose pension schemes together have no more than 15 members (Article 2(3)).
DORA does not ask the same of everyone. Financial entities apply the ICT risk management rules in line with their size, overall risk profile and the nature, scale and complexity of their services (Article 4). Some entities follow lighter rules:
The texts that make DORA operational are now in force, the first reporting cycles have run and EU oversight of critical providers has started. The list below covers final milestones only.
DORA groups its requirements into five areas. Each one turns resilience from a policy statement into something an institution has to be able to show. Under each pillar, you will find the main obligations, followed by the evidence a competent authority can request.
Everything starts with governance. Financial entities need a sound, comprehensive and documented ICT risk management framework, reviewed at least once a year and after major ICT-related incidents (Article 6(5)). The management body defines, approves and oversees that framework and bears the ultimate responsibility for managing ICT risk (Article 5(2)). The framework covers the identification of ICT-supported business functions and assets, protection and prevention, detection, response and recovery, backup policies, learning and evolving, and crisis communication (Articles 8 to 14). ICT business continuity plans and ICT response and recovery plans are tested at least yearly (Article 11(6)). For the security side of ICT risk, see our article on cybersecurity in financial institutions.
When something goes wrong, DORA expects a fast and structured response. Financial entities must detect, record and manage all ICT-related incidents and significant cyber threats (Article 17), classify them using the criteria in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1772, and report the major ones to their competent authority (Article 19).
Reporting happens in three steps, with time limits set by Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/301, Article 5:
Where a deadline falls on a weekend or bank holiday, financial entities may submit by noon on the next working day. This relief does not apply to initial notifications and intermediate reports from credit institutions, central counterparties, operators of trading venues and entities identified as essential or important under NIS2. When a major incident affects the financial interests of clients, the entity must also inform those clients without undue delay (Article 19(3)). Depending on the Member State, the same reports may also have to go to the national CSIRT set up under NIS2 (Article 19(1)).
DORA does not assume that controls work: it asks institutions to test them. Financial entities, other than microenterprises, establish a sound and comprehensive digital operational resilience testing programme as part of their ICT risk management framework (Article 24(1)) and follow a risk-based approach when conducting it (Article 24(3)). Appropriate tests are run at least yearly on all ICT systems and applications supporting critical or important functions (Article 24(6)). Entities identified by their competent authority also carry out threat-led penetration testing at least every three years (Article 26(1)), on live production systems, with a scope validated by the competent authority (Article 26(2)). The criteria for identifying those entities and the TLPT methodology are set out in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190.
Using an ICT provider does not shift the responsibility. Financial entities remain fully responsible for compliance when they use ICT third-party service providers. They maintain a register of information on all contractual arrangements for ICT services, at entity, sub-consolidated and consolidated level, and distinguish arrangements supporting critical or important functions (Article 28(3)). They report at least yearly to their competent authority on new arrangements and make the full register available on request. Before contracting, they assess risks, including concentration risk (Article 28(4)). For ICT services supporting critical or important functions, they need exit strategies (Article 28(8)) and contracts that include the extended provisions of Article 30(3), such as full service level descriptions, participation in TLPT and unrestricted rights of access, inspection and audit.
The register is also how supervisors map the market: the ESAs use the registers submitted through competent authorities to identify which providers are critical for the financial sector. For a deeper look at how DORA reshapes third-party governance beyond ICT providers, read our article on DORA third-party risk management.
Resilience is also a collective effort. Financial entities may exchange cyber threat information and intelligence, such as indicators of compromise and tactics, techniques and procedures, within trusted communities (Article 45(1)). Participation is voluntary, but entities that join an information-sharing arrangement must notify their competent authority (Article 45(3)).
When evidence falls short, competent authorities can act. Enforcement sits mainly at national level. DORA does not set fixed fines for financial entities. Member States lay down administrative penalties and remedial measures that are effective, proportionate and dissuasive, and may add criminal penalties (Articles 50 and 52). Competent authorities have full supervisory, investigatory and sanctioning powers, including access to any document or data, on-site inspections and the power to require corrective measures (Article 50(2)).
DORA also regulates the providers themselves. Through the Joint Committee and on a recommendation of the Oversight Forum, the ESAs designate the ICT third-party service providers that are critical for financial entities and appoint one of them as Lead Overseer for each provider (Article 31(1)). The designation criteria are set out in Article 31(2) and further specified in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1502. They include the systemic impact of a large-scale failure of the provider, the systemic importance of the financial entities that rely on it, their reliance on it for critical or important functions and the degree of substitutability of its services.
On 18 November 2025, the ESAs published the first list of 19 designated critical ICT third-party service providers. It includes the major cloud providers, large IT services and consulting firms, telecom and data centre operators, and financial data providers. The list is updated annually.
The Lead Overseer can request information, carry out general investigations and inspections, and issue recommendations (Article 35(1)). If a critical provider does not comply, the Lead Overseer can impose a periodic penalty payment of up to 1% of the provider's average daily worldwide turnover, on a daily basis and for up to six months (Article 35(6) to (8)).
Designation does not shift responsibility. Financial entities using a critical provider still own their ICT third-party risk, their register, their exit strategy and their contracts.
The first year of reporting is now on record. In June 2026, the ESAs published their report on major ICT-related incidents reported in 2025 under Article 22 of DORA. The report gives the first EU-wide view of how the regulation works in practice:
For compliance teams, the third-party share is the figure to watch. It confirms that register quality, contract provisions and exit strategies are more than an administrative exercise: a large part of operational risk sits there.
The threat picture is also moving. In July 2026, the ESAs published a statement on ICT risks from frontier AI models. It finds that the DORA requirements remain highly relevant and encourages financial entities to adjust their ICT risk management along three strategies: prevention, detection and management. It also asks competent authorities to ensure that management bodies are fully committed to mitigating these risks. For the wider regulatory context, see our article on the AI Act in the financial sector.
DORA will keep evolving through new standards, supervisory reports and the yearly update of the list of critical providers. Subscribe to our newsletter to follow these updates.
Both texts exist. Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 contains the requirements and applies directly in all Member States. Directive (EU) 2022/2556 amends existing sectoral directives to align them with the regulation.
DORA entered into force on 16 January 2023 and has applied since 17 January 2025.
Yes. ICT third-party service providers are in scope (Article 2(1)(u)). All of them are affected through the contractual requirements financial entities must impose. Those designated as critical by the ESAs are also subject to direct oversight by a Lead Overseer.
It is the register in which a financial entity records all its contractual arrangements for ICT services provided by ICT third-party service providers, distinguishing those that support critical or important functions (Article 28(3)). Its format is set by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2956. It is reported to competent authorities and used by the ESAs to designate critical providers.
The initial notification is due within 4 hours of classifying the incident as major and no later than 24 hours after becoming aware of it. The intermediate report follows within 72 hours of the initial notification, and the final report within one month of the latest intermediate report.
For part of the financial sector, the two overlap:
Member States set the administrative penalties and remedial measures for financial entities. Critical ICT third-party service providers that do not comply with the Lead Overseer's measures can face periodic penalty payments of up to 1% of their average daily worldwide turnover, for up to six months.